AN APPRAISAL OF GENERAL SANI ABACHA FOREIGN POLICY 1993-1998

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AN APPRAISAL OF GENERAL SANI ABACHA FOREIGN POLICY 1993-1998

ABSTRACT

This work appraises general Sani Abacha’s foreign policy from 1993 to 1998. The Abacha military regime, which ruled Nigeria from 17 November 1993 to 8 June 1998, could be summed up as a government engaged in a perpetual, if uneven, struggle with civil society organizations and the international community, both of which desired a rapid return to civilian and democratic rule. The Abacha junta, the spearhead of anti-democratic forces, won by substituting “the edict of the gun” for “the promise of a new dawn.” he pro-democracy forces’ resilience and perseverance, combined with a dash of providence, ensured that Nigerian civil society had the last laugh. Indeed, under Abacha, as in Rawlings’ Ghana in the 1980s, the rule of thumb was that, as Naomi Chazan puts it, “democratic rule has failed, but the promise of democracy endures.” While authoritarian rule prevails, democratic pressures persist.’

Abacha would be involved in what amounted to a ferocious battle of political credibility and legitimacy for the next five years, having literally shot down the historic presidential election results of 12 June 1993, as well as the democratic political structures of his predecessor’s transition program.

To survive, he used a combination of force, namely the stick or threat of force and the actual use of force against the political opposition, and the carrot or a reward system in relation to social forces, groups, and individuals who supported the regime.

As a result, Richard Sklar is correct when he says in his chapter, “although brute force has kept the military in power and taken the lives of its enemies from time to time, the regime’s durability (was) attributable to consent as well as force.” What Abacha lacked – and deservedly so – was the power of the ‘kiss,’ that is, the ability to inspire loyalty, respect, and commitment from a citizenry looking for a new lease on life.

Human Rights Watch/Africa, Nigeria: Permanent Transition: Current Human Rights Violations in Nigeria palace coup carried out against the backdrop of a High Court ruling in early November 1993 that the Interim National Government (ING), – Babangida’s stopgap measure on the eve of his’stepping down’ from power – was illegal, and had as one of its first acts the promulgation of the ING (Validation) Decree, which nullified the High Court ruling. By that single act, the fledgling regime also sought to tarnish Abiola’s mandate.

It would later launch a full-fledged propaganda campaign aimed at ethicizing or denationalizing June 12. Worse, it would launch a two-pronged attack on the political opposition as well as civil society groups and ethnic nationalities, for whom June 12 had become a formidable platform for combating long-standing socio-political and economic inequities and injustice in Nigerian politics.

To understand the Abacha junta’s political trajectory – why it came to power, how it managed to stay in power, and its strategic designs – we must engage with the regime both theoretically and empirically. By doing so, we would also gain a better understanding of the military’s structural legacy and its role in the current, post-1999, travails of the country’s fourth democratic experiment.

Primary and secondary data were used the analysis. Both frequency distribution and regression analysis were used.

It was observed therefore that the effect of General Sani Abacha’s foreign policy on Nigeria economic development in those years(1993 – 1998) was not significant. Also, there was a negative relationship between the policies and the Nation’s development.

Most of the policies made during the regime were unpopular and were frowned upon by western powers. This discouraged both foreign direct and foreign private investments which were very much needed to drive economic growth in Nigeria

The work is made of five chapters with bibliography and list of reference

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