ATTENTION:

BEFORE YOU READ THE ABSTRACT OR CHAPTER ONE OF THE PROJECT TOPICS BELOW, PLEASE READ THE INFORMATION BELOW.THANK YOU!

INFORMATION:

YOU CAN GET THE COMPLETE PROJECT OF THE TOPIC BELOW. THE FULL PROJECT COST N5,000 ONLY. THE FULL INFORMATION ON HOW TO PAY AND GET THE COMPLETE PROJECT IS AT THE BOTTOM OF THIS PAGE. OR

YOU CAN CALL: 08068231953, 08137701720, 09070569307, 08154275408

WHATSAPP US ON: 08137701720

AFRICAN UNION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

  1. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The Anglophones of Cameroon, 20 per cent of the population, feel marginalised. Their frustrations surfaced dramatically at the end of 2016 when a series of sectoral grievances morphed into political demands, leading to strikes and riots. The movement grew to the point where the government’s repressive approach was no longer sufficient to calm the situation, forcing it to negotiate with Anglophone trade unions and make some concessions. Popular mobilisation is now weakening, but the majority of Anglophones are far from happy. Having lived through three months with no internet, six months of general strikes and one school year lost, many are now demanding federalism or secession. Ahead of presidential elections next year, the resurgence of the Anglophone problem could bring instability. The government, with the support of the international community, should quickly take measures to calm the situation, with the aim of rebuilding trust and getting back to dialogue.

Generally little understood by Francophones, the Anglophone problem dates back to the independence period. A poorly conducted re-unification, based on centralisation and assimilation, has led the Anglophone minority to feel politically and economically marginalised, and that their cultural difference are ignored.

 Never before has tension around the Anglophone issue been so acute.

The current crisis is a particularly worrying resurgence of an old problem. Never before has tension around the Anglophone issue been so acute. The mobilisation of lawyers, teachers and students starting in October 2016, ignored then put down by the government, has revived identity-based movements which date back to the 1970s. These movements are demanding a return to the federal model that existed from 1961 to 1972. Trust between Anglophone activists and the government has been undermined by the arrest of the movement’s leading figures and the cutting of the internet, both in January. Since then, the two Anglophone regions have lived through general strikes, school boycotts and sporadic violence.

Small secessionist groups have emerged since January. They are taking advantage of the situation to radicalise the population with support from part of the Anglophone diaspora. While the risk of partition of the country is low, the risk of a resurgence of the problem in the form of armed violence is high, as some groups are now advocating that approach.

The government has taken several measures since March – creating a National Commission for Bilingualism and Multiculturalism; creating new benches for Common Law at the Supreme Court and new departments at the National School of Administration and Magistracy; recruiting Anglophone magistrates and 1,000 bilingual teachers; and turning the internet back on after a 92-day cut. But the leaders of the Anglophone movement have seen these measures as too little too late.

International reaction has been muted, but has nevertheless pushed the government to adopt the measures described above. The regime in Yaoundé seems more sensitive to international than to national pressure. Without firm, persistent and coordinated pressure from its international partners, it is unlikely that the government will seek lasting solutions.

The Anglophone crisis is in part a classic problem of a minority, which has swung between a desire for integration and a desire for autonomy, and in part a more structural governance problem. It shows the limits of centralised national power and the ineffectiveness of the decentralisation program started in 1996. The weak legitimacy of most of the Anglophone elites in their region, under-development, tensions between generations, and patrimonialism are ills common to the whole country. But the combination of bad governance and an identity issue could be particularly tough to resolve.

Dealing with the Anglophone problem requires a firmer international reaction and to rebuild trust through coherent measures that respond to the sectoral demands of striking teachers and lawyers. There is some urgency: the crisis risks undermining the approaching elections. In that context, several steps should be taken without delay:

The president of the republic should publicly recognise the problem and speak out to calm tensions.

The leaders of the Anglophone movement should be provisionally released.

Members of the security forces who have committed abuses should be sanctioned.

The government should quickly put in place the measures announced in March 2017, and the 21 points agreed on with unions in January.

The government and senior administration should be re-organised to better reflect the demographic, political and historical importance of the Anglophones, and to include younger and more legitimate members of the Anglophones community.

The National Commission on Bilingualism and multiculturalism should be restructured to include an equal number of Anglophones as Francophones, to guarantee the independence of its members and to give it powers to impose sanctions.

The government should desist from criminalising the political debate on Anglophone Cameroon, including on federalism, in particular by ceasing to use the anti-terrorism law for political ends and by considering recourse to a third party (the church or international partner) as a mediator between the government and Anglophone organisations.

In the longer term, Cameroon must undertake institutional reforms to remedy the deeper problems of which the Anglophone issue is the symptom. In particular, decentralisation laws should be rigorously applied, and improved, to reduce the powers of officials nominated by Yaoundé, create regional councils, and better distribute financial resources and powers. Finally, it is important to take legal measures specific to Anglophone regions in the areas of education, justice and culture.

Cameroon, facing Boko Haram in the Far North and militia from the Central African Republic in the East, needs to avoid another potentially destabilising front opening up. If the Anglophone problem got worse it would disrupt the presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for 2018. Above all, it could spark off further demands throughout the country and lead to a wider political crisis.

            The history of Africa has been replete with conflicts. Conflicts have ripped through the continent such that in Africa today, conflict in human security has emerged. The resultant effects are increasing internal conflicts, frustrated aspirations and rising social tensions. Other effects are the displacement of people from their societies, value systems as well as loss of governments and institutions. The need to rid the continent from the scourge of conflicts and crises necessitated the birth of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) on 25 May 1963 (Obasanjo, 2005).

            The initial OAU mechanism for conflict management in Africa was the Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (CMCA), which came into effect in 1964. However, the post Cold War era brought about a new political stability and social economic development. Thus, the OAU attempted to change its mechanism for conflict management by adopting the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR)         in 1993 (Lemarchand). This mechanism was found to be deficient in some areas especially, the power to interfere in the internal affairs of member states. This was amongst the reasons for the transformation of the Organization into the African Union (AU)    in 2004 (Imobighe, 2003:67).  Today, Africa is plagued by conflicts most of which are intra state in nature. Thus, the regional organisation, AU has its hands full of crises requiring resolution. These conflicts and crises which occurred mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa have been protracted, thus posing serious challenges to the AU.

            The drift by some African States into unmitigated chaos became a constant source of worry to many leaders in the continent and the international community at large. The series of conferences and summits held across the continent reflected this. It was at an Ordinary Summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in 2001 that the Constitutive Act of AU was adopted by 53 member states of the OAU in Lome, Togo           (Salim, 2002:18). Furthermore, the desire for a stronger organisation that would be capable of handling the numerous conflicts that plagued the continent provided the initiative that paved the way for the birth of the AU. This process began in Sirte, Libya in September 1999 during an extraordinary summit of the OAU (Salim, 2002:23).

The AU, thus aimed at achieving greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and its people, defending the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its member states. It was also to accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent; and promote peace, security and stability on the continent (Constitutive Act of the AU, Article 4).

The Constitutive Act of the Union was then to enter into force 30 days after the deposit of the instrument of ratification by two-thirds of the member states of the OAU. Consequently,      the Act entered into force on 26 May 2000 after Nigeria deposited its instrument of ratification with the OAU Secretariat on 26     April 2000; being the thirty-sixth member state to do so (Constitutive Act of the AU, Article 4).

At its inception, the AU in a bid to realise collective security in the continent set out certain principles to guide the union. The principles and values informing the African Collective Security Policy include, inter-alia, the principles contained in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the AU.

            The indivisibility of the security of African States is made such that the security of one African country is inseparably linked to the security of other African countries, and the African continent as a whole. Accordingly, any threat or aggression on one African country is deemed to be a threat or aggression on the others and the continent as a whole. These threats are then brought to the immediate attention of the Assembly of the Union or the Peace and Security Council (PSC) for decision and action as appropriate, in conformity with the AU principles and objectives (Constitutive Act of the AU, Article 4).

            Conscious of the inadequacy of the clause of                       non-interference in the affairs of member states, a new clause in the Constitutive Act of the AU expressed the right of the Union to intervene. This is in pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. The clause resulted from experiences gained in previous conflict management attempts in the continent under the OAU.

            The AU has been involved in the management of the Sudanese, Ethiopia-Eritrea and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) crises among others in Africa. However, with the eventual transformation of the OAU into AU, crises management and peace support operations remain a process.  This in the opinion of many still requires extra efforts on the part of the organisation. Salim Ahmed Salim, a former Secretary General of OAU succinctly made the point when he declared:

…with the creation of the mechanism for conflict prevention, management in Cairo in 1993, a view and significantly different vision emerged in one continent. The creation of that mechanism signified a change from the position of “don’t interfere” to one “collective concern” for the peace, security and stability of the people of our continent. The doctrine became what happens to my neighbour is my responsibility also”. Since then, the issue of internal conflicts has become a matter of continental concern (Constitutive Act of the AU, Article 4). 

The management of conflicts and crises by Africans has thus presented an opportunity on the emergence of the AU. Though the AU is still new, the expectations of Africans in the ability of the organisation to manage conflicts and crises, is indeed very high. It remains to be seen if this optimism can be translated into effective conflict and crises management which would lead to successful conflict resolution.

1.2      STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

            The African continent has been synonymous with conflicts even before the formation of the OAU and now AU. This situation cannot be divorced from historical factors surrounding the formation of nation states in Africa prominent among which was the partition of the continent by the European powers at the Berlin Conference of 1884 to 1885. This conference was to change the course of events in Africa. It brought people with different and antagonistic ideologies together under single states without putting in place mechanisms to ensure harmonious existence among them. This was the starting point of recurrent conflicts and crises in Africa.

            In the Post Cold War era, African conflicts and crises have been largely intrastate except the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict and that of the DRC (Salim, 2002:33). They have also been too frequent that the AU appears overwhelmed. The recurrence of conflicts in the continent has become a factor for the assumption that AU mechanisms for conflict management are perhaps deficient in some respects.

            If the AU must improve on its mechanisms for conflict management and peace support operations, the challenges confronting the organisation need to be identified with a view to working out a better approach. It is in this context that this research examines the issues and prospects of AU conflict management.

1.3      OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH

            The following under listed are the objectives of this research:

(1)       To discuss the AU mechanisms for conflict and conflict management in Africa.

(2)       To discuss the challenges of the current AU conflict management mechanisms.

(3)       Examine the prospects of enhancing AU mechanisms for crises management in the continent.

(4)       To suggest possible ways on how best to improve the AU mechanisms for crises management.

1.4      SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

            The importance of this study is appreciable in the fact that:

(1)       The AU Secretariat staff and policy makers would benefit from it as it presents viable prospects to address issues raised.

(2)       It will also contribute to the existing body of knowledge on crises management by the AU in Africa.

(3)       It will serve as reference material for further research in the area of crises management.

1.5      SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH

            This research covers events in Africa regarding conflicts  from 2000 to 2008. This period provides room for assessing the efficiency of AU mechanisms for conflict management from her inception to date.

1.6      LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

            The study faced with some limitations. This arose from the inability of the researcher to interview key individuals who are stakeholders in conflict management under the auspices of the AU. However, a few interviews of past officials of the AU and some diplomats as well as military personnel who had participated in AU Peace Support Operations (PSOs) assisted in the attainment of the research objectives.

1.7      RESEARCH QUESTIONS

            This study answered the following research questions:

(1)       Is there any significant relationship between AU mechanisms for conflict management and conflict management in Africa?

(2)       Are AU mechanisms for conflict management in Africa effective?

(3)       Are there challenges and prospects of AU mechanisms for conflict management in Africa?

(4)       Are there other measures that could be adopted by the AU to make its mechanisms for conflict management more effective in the continent?

1.8      RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

            The study tested the following hypotheses:

(1)       H– The AU mechanisms for conflict management is not faced with challenges in managing conflict in Africa.

(2)       HA  – The AU mechanisms for conflict management is faced with challenges in managing conflict in Africa.

1.9        RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

            The research needs to identify the issues and prospects of AU mechanisms for conflict management.  To do this, an authentic and reliable research methodology is needed.  This focuses on the steps taken by the researcher in conducting the study.  This includes the identification of variables, research design, area of study, population, sample and sampling techniques.  The methodology also covers the instruments for data collection, validation and reliability of the instruments, methods of data collection, method of data analysis and weaknesses of the methodology.

1.9.1         Identification of the Variables

                   The variables in this research are qualitative in nature because they vary in kind rather than in magnitude. The independent variable is conflict management while the dependent variable is AU mechanism. Therefore, the more efficient AU Mechanism is the more effective conflict management in Africa will be.

1.9.2  Research Design

Due to the complex nature of conflict management in Africa, the researcher adopted a combination of historical, descriptive and experimental research methods in this work.  The historical method allowed the researcher to determine what led to existing mechanisms for conflict management by the AU while the descriptive method made it possible to determine the nature of existing mechanisms. The descriptive research design includes survey research, case study, developmental studies, correlation studies and causal comparative or ex-post factor studies. However, the survey method was used in this study.  This enabled the researcher to administer questionnaires to many respondents concurrently.

The experimental method enabled the researcher to employ both the historical and descriptive values to discover the challenges of AU.  It also assisted the researcher to predict the prospect of conflict management by the AU as well as make some recommendations.  Furthermore, it enabled the researcher to identify and test the cause and effect relationship between the independent and the dependent variables.

1.9.3         Sample and Sampling Techniques

                   The sample used in this study included military personnel that participated in AU Peace Support Operations (PSO). Others include diplomats, university lecturers and persons with relevant experience in the field of conflict management.  Thus, stratified random sampling technique was used for selection of sample from the population.  This was to ensure that relevant characteristics like social status, ranks, participation in AU PSOs and other important factors were considered.  The selection also considered educational background of the sample population.  This ensured that each category of the sample was proportionally represented.  The sampling technique used in this work therefore guaranteed the representation of all relevant interest groups.

1.9.4         Instruments of Data Collection

A combination of researcher-designed questionnaire and unstructured interviews were used for data collection.  A sample copy of the questionnaire and the questions asked during the unstructured interviews are at Appendixes II and III respectively.  The questionnaire was divided into two sections.  The first section contained information on the personal profile of the respondent.  The personal profile information included age, occupation, rank, academic qualification and participation in AU PSO.  The second section consisted a twenty nine item questionnaire structure, placed in a four point-scale of Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Strongly Disagree (SD) and Disagree (D).

HOW TO RECEIVE PROJECT MATERIAL (S)

After paying the appropriate amount (#5,000) into our bank Account below, send the following information to any of the numbers below

08068231953, 08137701720, 09070569307, 08154275408 (1)    Your project topics

(2)     Email Address

(3)     Payment Name

OR you drop them on our WhatsApp, 08137701720

We will send your material(s) after we receive bank alert

BANK ACCOUNTS

Account Name: AMUTAH DANIEL CHUKWUDI

Account Number: 0046579864

Bank: GTBank.

OR

Account Name: AMUTAH DANIEL CHUKWUDI

Account Number: 3139283609

Bank: FIRST BANK

FOR MORE INFORMATION, CALL:

08068231953, 08137701720, 09070569307, 08154275408 

 AFFILIATE LINKS:

easyprojectmaterials.com

easyprojectmaterials.com.ng

http://graduateprojects.com.ng

http://freshprojects.com.ng

http://info247.com.ng

projectstores.com.ng

projectgraduates.com.ng

projectgraduate.com.ng

igraduateprojects.com.ng

igraduateproject.com.ng

graduateproject.com.ng

iprojectgraduate.com.ng

iprojectgraduates.com.ng

i-graduateproject.com.ng

i-graduateprojects.com.ng

By admin

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *